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A COMPETITION LAW APPROACH TO GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET
INTEGRATION
CLAUS-DIETER EHLERMANN*

My subject is "A Competition Law Approach to Global Intellectual Property and Telecommunications Market Integration." I would
like to point out that I am really not an expert on intellectual property
rights. Also, my experience with competition law in practice is relatively recent. During the five and one-half years when I was in charge
of DGIV, I was never particularly concerned with global intellectual
property rights. We were concerned with intellectual property rights,
but not global intellectual property rights. Unlike all other participants, I will not present original ideas. I will limit myself to discussing
potentially relevant elements of my experience as head of DGIV.
Let us take intellectual property as the first subject, and here we
can turn to the new group exemption, which is almost ready for adoption. There will no longer be one group exemption for patents and
another one for knowhow. There will be only one. We had difficulties
basing our decisions on relevant data-what are we really regulating?
What is the reality? And it is probably the last time that DGIV will
put out a legal text without first doing a Green Paper or White Book
and asking for submissions and discussions. By the way, that seems to
me to be the only way for the regulator to respond to this dilemmawhat is the factual basis? One has to listen to opposing views.
The final version of the group exemption will be less ambitious
than the initial one, as we have made an attempt to move closer to
economic reality. The most important innovation in the current draft
is that the group exemption will not apply to licensees who already
have forty percent market share overall. This is intended to avoid the
strengthening of dominant positions and, as the official explanation
notes, the facilitating of exclusionary practices. I am sure that this
aspect will be subject to debate.
* Professor of Law, European Law Institute, Florence and Member of the WTO Appellate Body.
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Let me now switch to individual cases. The first case which
comes to mind here is the Magill judgment, where, contrary to what
many of us expected, the Court of Justice upheld a decision by the
Court of First Instance. The Court of First Instance had approved a
Commission decision declaring a specific practice of television broadcasters to be abuse of a dominant position. The television broadcasters had used a copyright theory to deny to Magill, the Applicant, the
possibility of publishing a weekly survey of the television programs
they broadcast. The court's decision thus represents a direct interference with the role of a copyright and goes beyond earlier cases involving intellectual property rights.
I suppose that the intellectual property rights community was
pretty upset by the judgment, and if the Commission were to make
mass use of this new jurisprudence, I think it would have important
consequences. Personally, however, I do not expect the Commission
to make frequent use of the Magill possibilities, simply because Magill
seemed to me to be a borderline case. Moreover, one of the elements
which is not addressed at all, but seems to me important in the understanding of what is going on, is whether there was any serious justification for applying copyright principles in the first place. The copyright
was in a list of programs that a TV station produced, and I do not
consider that really an original work that intellectual property rights
should protect. That is at least my personal position. My view has
been "Let's not exploit this judgment to the full," and the Commission
probably will not.
As I mentioned, however, there are also earlier cases. In the
Ford case, for example, the issue involved rights relating to body parts
for automobiles. The Court had to deal with two factors. First, was
there really dominance? And second, was the refusal to allow others
to produce these parts an abuse? Whether there was dominance is a
very difficult question. It is necessary to distinguish between two
kinds of dominance. The first is what I call horizontal or market dominance: Microsoft is, for example, horizontally dominant with respect
to all its competitors on certain markets. There was a tendency in
DGIV to apply, more or less mechanically, the principles used in horizontal cases to another type of dominance, what I call family or system dominance. This occurs where a firm controls a system, like an
automobile, and you have suppliers and distributors that are part of
that family, and who depend, of course, as members of the family, on
the producer of the car. I consider it fundamentally wrong to apply to
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that situation mechanically, automatically, concepts which competition lawyers apply in cases of horizontal dominance.
The Kodak case in the United States addressed this dilemma a
couple of years ago, and it is one of the most difficult ones I have
come across in my five and one-half years. Nobody will convince me
that this is a pure competition issue. It depends very much on what
notion of competition you have, what notion of restriction of competition you have, and whether you are a single-goal follower or one who
believes that competition policy should pursue several goals. European competition law, contrary to at least part of American competition law theory, pursues several different objectives. At least if one is
honest, protecting small and medium-sized companies is based on the
theoretical underpinning of freedom of contract, and that is totally
contrary to the Chicago School.
This leads me to a different consideration. We have had arguments within the Commission about whether problems of this kind
should be addressed by case law or whether one should legislate. You
may be astonished to hear that I am in favor of legislation. I was very
happy that on the automobile body-part issue, the Commission proposed a directive (which-miracle of miracles-sought protection for
three years and not for seven, or twelve, or thirty). Why am I in favor
of legislation? Basically because it increases predictability. There is
an element of uncertainty with respect to the determination of both
dominance and abuse, and all these issues involve not only delicate
economic considerations, but also value judgments. As a result, the
outcomes are hardly foreseeable by economic operators. That is
something which industry clearly does not like, and it should be
avoided.
Another group of cases involves pooling-of films, of rights to
records, disks, etc. It comes close to David Gerber's concept of networks and the role of intellectual property in these networks. I do hot
remember the name of the joint venture which was being discussed
between the United States Department of Justice and DGIV when
Diane Wood was still with the Justice Department, and where, for
once, we were not totally on the same line. MTV complained about a
pool of very powerful worldwide producers and owners of intellectual
property with respect to records. It illustrates the delicacy of the situation. On the one hand, small and medium-sized owners of copyrights
need to pool in order to be able to reasonably license their rights.
But, is the same true for giants like Philips? The respective impacts
on competition are likely to be very different.
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1. Mergers
The Commission is known for being 'elatively generous with respect to research and development. It has been criticized in Germany
for being too generous. According to one of the arguments, the Commission does not realize that there is a separate market for R&D technology. Now, as far as I remember, the first merger case in which a
separate market for research and development technology was identified was Shell Montacatini, where two dominant technologies were
being combined. The solution was to separate the technology market,
which was considered world-wide, from the rest of the joint venture,
and not to allow the joint venture to pool the two dominant
technologies.
Another interesting case, which you might want to look at, is
Glaxo-Wellcome. Glaxo bought Wellcome, apparently because of interesting research going on there. Again, the two markets were considered to be separate. The drug market is traditionally national,
while, the decision says, the intellectual property market is probably
worldwide. The problem was solved because Glaxo has a very important position on certain national markets for a migraine drug which it
was willing to license. And, in addition, the Commission said the
dominant position was vulnerable because there are other drug companies working on, and probably putting on the market before the end
of the century, a similarly powerful drug.
I will close this chapter by drawing your attention to a significant
sentence in one of the relatively few prohibition decisions on mergers
that happens to be on the telecommunications side. It is the MSG
Media decision, the second after the famous De Havilland decision.
The sentence reads:
Although a monopoly in a future market that is only just beginning
to develop should not necessarily be regarded as a dominant position within the meaning of the merger regulation, the assumption
that no market dominance exists presupposes that the future market
in question remains open to future competition, and therefore the
monopoly is only temporary.
2.

Telecommunications

It is useful to distinguish here between two separate developments which are nevertheless strongly interrelated. The first is
demonopolization. I prefer this term to deregulation because a
demonopolized situation might require more regulation than you
need under the monopoly. You know probably that there are Council
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resolutions which provide for the abolition of all monopoly rights,
both for services and for infrastructure, from January 1, 1998, with an
exception for peripheral, less-developed networks-Spain, Portugal
and Greece, where an additional five-year period would bring it to
2003, and a two-year possibility for Luxembourg as a very small network. The Commission adopted in July of this year a draft directive
under Article 90, the famous provision which addresses state-owned
enterprises and enterprises with special rights, exclusive rights. This
draft is very, very interesting for all those who are concerned, not only
with telecommunications, but also with regulated industries in general. The directive, once adopted, will consolidate the legal situation
for telecommunications services and infrastructure, plus the exemptions, from January 1, 1998. Until then we will remain in a transitional
period of partial liberalization.
If time permitted, I would love to compare telecommunications
with other regulated sectors like transport, particularly air transport,
postal services and electricity. In none of these sectors do we see a
similar movement. Airlines are the most comparable. The legal road
pursued has been different-not Commission but Council action. The
area which is most frustrating, most disappointing, is electricity. It is
not because of the greater economic insight and wisdom of European
politicians that liberalization has occurred in telecommunications. It
is because of the technological revolution. If we had a similar technological revolution in electricity, and similar worldwide exchanges, the
electricity markets would not remain what they are. And here one
sees clearly the benefits of technology, evolving with extraordinary
speed, and evolving worldwide, and not only on national markets.
Very briefly, with respect to restructuring in the telecommunications industries. In the Union, there are two dimensions-one is the
opening of national markets in view of the internal market, and the
other is worldwide competition. Europe traditionally has had too
many operators, because all these markets were national monopolies.
Therefore, some of them have to join together within Europe. In addition, if you are not linked to other players in other parts of the
world, you will not be a world player on the telecommunications market. This brings to mind three groupings-one is Unisource, which
brings together telecommunications firms from Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, with AT&T as their potential business
partner. A second one that was approved by the Commission after
long and difficult negotiations is called Concert, a joint venture between British Telecom ("BT") and MCI. The third one, which is giv-
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ing rise to the biggest problems, technical and political, is Atlas, a joint
venture between Deutsche Telekom and France T616com; their American partner is Sprint. The problems are with Atlas, not with Atlas+Sprint. These are restructuring operations among existing
telecommunications operators, but you also have, of course, the entry
of new operators. All member states, I think, have now given a second or even a third license for mobile communications operations.
Then you have joint ventures focused on services to the business
community-data communications, internal communications, etc.,
with a view to moving later into public voice communications. The
main players in Germany are utilities, which have their pockets full of
money, monopoly rents-regional electricity companies, because Germany does not have a national electricity monopoly. They are all doing extremely well, and they are putting their money, of course, into
telecommunications-satellites, media software. Their international
partners are very often the Baby Bells.
From a competition point of view, these joint ventures are, on the
one hand, extremely beneficial, because the number of players is increased. But, at least during this transitional phase, there is a danger
that they will strengthen existing monopoly positions, because even if
you take away the legal monopoly right, you do not immediately eliminate the factual monopoly. A firm that has its network in place and
has its infrastructure remains dominant. And that is very much the
issue with Atlas (Deutsche Telekom and France T616com). The Commission is seeking to open up the market more rapidly through parallel networks, but that might not be enough. One also has to control
restraints on competition agreed to by the parties; this cannot be done
by creating possibilities on other networks. For inspiration, the best
example is what has been done by MCI and BT in discussions with the
Commission.
There have also been some decisions prohibiting mergers. It is
interesting that after DeHavilland,the only prohibition decisions from
the Commission have been in the telecommunications sector. The
first of these (second after DeHavilland) is Media Service, a company
formed by Deutsche Telekom, Bertelsmann (after Warner, I think the
biggest producer of boxed films, etc. in the entertainment business)
and Kirch, which holds the most rights to films. Bertelsmann and
Kirch are both in pay TV, and the idea was to establish together techniques to control access to pay TV, a sort of gatekeeper function, and
the assumption of the Commission was that if these three together do

19961

A COMPETITION LAW APPROACH

that, there will be no other competition on the German market, you
can forget about it. Therefore, the prohibition.
In another recent prohibition three Nordic companies-the Norwegian and Danish telecommunications operators and the Swedish
conglomerate Kinnevik-agreed to set up a satellite system just for
Scandinavia. It would have created a dominant position on the Scandinavian market.
And the last one which the Commission has forbidden (at the
request, by the way, of the Dutch government, which does not have
merger control, but which asked the Commission to step in, as otherwise Community rules would not apply) is a grouping between the
Luxembourg RTL and Radio Monte Carlo, both of them very important on the publicity side for private television, plus the most important producer of films. It is a little like the situation in MSG Media
Service. That is a very recent decision. These then are the structural
cases.
On the behavioral side, this transition in the telecommunications
area requires frequently the application of Article VIII, because all
tools are used, or potentially useable by the dominant incumbents, to
try to prevent newcomers from attaining a market share, and this can
be done with the help of the state through the licensing process.
There is a case in the pipeline with respect to Italy in which the government has asked for something like a billion deutschmarks from
Omnitel, the second mobile telephone operator, but has asked for no
money from the incumbent Italian telecommunications operators.
This means a high entrance fee for the newcomer, and no fee for the
incumbent-it should be the other way around. And you can use
other devices as well, such as numbering, telephone directories, rightsof-way, interconnects and lines (in the beginning, at least, newcomers
need the lines of the incumbent telecommunications operators).
Remedies are transparency, unbundling, separate accounting, and, of
course, competitive infrastructure. The decision to open up infrastructure recognizes that as necessary to prevent abuses. Privatization
is, of course, not a suitable remedy, because it merely replaces a public
monopoly with a private one. According to the newspapers, the latest
offer of the Europeans at the WTO with respect to telecommunications is subject to certain ownership restrictions imposed by the
French, the Belgians, and, I think, the Spanish. It is also said that they
would be willing to waive those restrictions in return for elimination
of certain ownership restrictions that still exist in the United States.
In any event, I do not believe that ownership restrictions will be intro-

508

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:501

duced at the level of the Community. The deregulatory forces in telecommunications are much stronger than the regulatory forces,
because of the weakness of the European Union's political system and
the difficulties of reaching decisions among fifteen member states.
Therefore, it is perfectly possible that the deregulatory process in Europe will lead to a freer market than anywhere else.

